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ESICA: Securing—Not Compelling—
Speech on the “Vast Democratic 
Forums” of the Internet 
Philip Primeau* 
“While we now may be coming to the realization that the 
Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot 
appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter 




America’s democratic political order requires “free trade in 
ideas.”3  Today, this vital exchange is increasingly conducted 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2021.  I would like to thank Professor Andrew Spacone for his guidance and 
insight. 
1. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
2. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 11:15
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266387743996870656; see 
Bobby Allyn, As Trump Targets Twitter’s Legal Shield, Experts Have A 
Warning, NPR (May 30, 2020 11:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/30/
865813960/as-trump-targets-twitters-legal-shield-experts-have-a-warning 
[https://perma.cc/QL6R-KCX4].  
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238, 264 (1986) (“Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a 
democracy; as this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech ‘is the 
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.’” 
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937))); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
2021] FREE SPEECH 161 
via online social media platforms.4  However, some have alleged 
that these platforms moderate political content in a biased 
manner, jeopardizing the integrity of public discourse.5  In 
June 2019, Senator Josh Hawley responded to such concerns by 
introducing the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act 
(ESICA).6  ESICA would require providers of interactive 
computer services of a certain size—including all major social 
media platforms (e.g., YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)—to 
demonstrate politically neutral content moderation policies in 
order to enjoy the legal immunity currently afforded 
U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (“[T]he opportunity for free political discussion is a basic 
tenet of our constitutional democracy.”). 
4. See, e.g., Diana Owen, The Past Decade and Future of Political Media:
The Ascendance of Social Media, BBVA, https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/
en/articles/the-past-decade-and-future-of-political-media-the-ascendance-of-
social-media/ [perma.cc/8XVS-X7DK] (last visited Jan 13, 2021).  On the effect 
of social media on political discourse, one commentator observed: 
Digital media have vastly increased the potential for political 
information to reach even the most disinterested citizens.  Attention 
to the 2018 midterm elections was inordinately high, and the ability 
for citizens to express themselves openly through social media has 
contributed to this engagement.  Issues and events that might be 
outside the purview of mainstream journalists can be brought to 
prominence by ordinary citizens. 
Id.  One survey found that “[twenty percent] of social media users say they’ve 
modified their stance on a social or political issue because of material they saw 
on social media, and [seventeen percent] say social media has helped to change 
their views about a specific political candidate.”  Monica Anderson, Social 
media causes some users to rethink their views on an issue, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/07/social-
media-causes-some-users-to-rethink-their-views-on-an-issue/ 
[perma.cc/K9EL-APPW].  
5. See, e.g., Queenie Wong, Is Facebook censoring conservatives or is
moderating just too hard?, CNET (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.cnet.com/features/is-facebook-censoring-conservatives-or-is-
moderating-just-too-hard/ [perma.cc/GY3R-PRR6]; Sara Harrison, No One’s 
Happy With YouTube’s Content Moderation Policies, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2019, 
07:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/no-ones-happy-youtubes-content-
moderation/ [perma.cc/4MYD-M8G3]; Linda Givetash, Laura Loomer banned 
from Twitter after criticizing Ilhan Omar, NBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2018, 8:01 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/laura-loomer-banned-twitter-after-
criticizing-ilhan-omar-n939256 [perma.cc/8YCB-JEK5]. 
6. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong.
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf 
[perma.cc/JB3V-QMYZ].  All signs suggest that Hawley will resubmit the bill 
to the 117th Congress. 
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automatically by Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (Section 230).7  Since its proposal, critics have suggested 
that the bill is unconstitutional because, among other reasons, 
it compels speech in violation of the First Amendment.8 
This Comment argues that ESICA is an important attempt to 
secure democratic free speech culture on the internet and that it 
would not unconstitutionally compel speech from the major social 
media platforms.9  Part I will look at the relationship between 
democracy, free speech, and social media, as well as the promise of 
America’s digital democracy and the threat posed thereto by 
politically biased content moderation on the major social media 
platforms.  Part II will examine how ESICA would mitigate this 
threat by altering the immunity regime established by Section 230. 
Part III will contend that ESICA does not impermissibly compel the 
major social media platforms to speak in violation of the First 
Amendment. 
7. Id. § 2; see Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230.
8. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., How Conservatives’ Campaign To
Impose Political Neutrality Regulation On Big Tech Will Backfire, FORBES 
(Dec. 23, 2019, 1:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/
2019/12/23/how-conservatives-effort-to-impose-political-neutrality-regulation-
on-big-tech-will-backfire/ [perma.cc/UUD5-KJLG]. Critics have attacked 
ESICA on other constitutional grounds (such as vagueness), but this Comment 
limits itself to considering the compelled speech critique.  See, e.g., Eric 
Goldman, Comments on Sen. Hawley’s “[Ending] Support for Internet 
Censorship Act,” TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 10, 2019), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/07/comments-on-sen-hawleys-
ending-support-for-internet-censorship-act.htm [perma.cc/7UEN-MQP8] 
(putting forth a number of critiques of ESICA and collecting other sources).   
9. This Comment focuses on what it calls “major social media platforms,”
particularly Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, which have been at the forefront 
of the content moderation controversy.  See sources cited supra note 5.  Its 
constitutional analysis is tailored with an eye toward those platforms. 
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I. THE PROMISE OF THE “VAST DEMOCRATIC FORUMS” OF THE
INTERNET 
A. Democracy and Free Speech
Democracy is often envisioned as the semi-regular ritual of
ballot-casting.10  Certainly, the selection of officials to make, 
execute, and enforce laws on behalf of the people is a solemn 
privilege of democratic citizenship.11  Yet, any account of democracy 
that limits itself to this electoral liturgy is woefully incomplete. 
Democracy is not an event or set of procedures, but an open-ended 
practice of reasoning together about social and political matters.  It 
is a mode of common life characterized by an accessible, 
transparent, and broad-based participatory discourse.12  American 
democracy involves a wide range of public actions—debates, 
parades, petitions, pickets, prayers, marches, incidents of civil 
disobedience, and conscientious objection—whereby citizens air 
their grievances, advance their interests, demand accountability, 
chasten government officials, resolve community tensions, engage 
in self-expression, and propose competing visions of the just society. 
Democracy neither begins nor ends with the ballot box and it 
cannot be reduced to the periodic election of governments.  The very 
“value and efficacy” of voting hinges on the “equal freedom . . . of 
examining and discussing [candidates’] merits and demerits.”13  In 
10. See, e.g., Ian Prasad Philbrick & David Leonhardt, How to Participate
in Politics, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/guides/year-of-living-
better/how-to-participate-in-government [perma.cc/2RZA-EFE3] (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2021) (“Voting is the most fundamental form of civic engagement in a 
democracy.”).  This “proceduralist” view of democracy is quite common.  See 
Siddhartha Baviskar & Mary Fran T. Malone, What Democracy Means to 
Citizens—and Why It Matters, 76 EUR. REV. OF LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN
STUDIES 3, 4 (2004). 
11. See Martin Luther King, Jr., “Give Us the Ballot,” Address Delivered
at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom (May 17, 1957), in 4 THE PAPERS OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SYMBOL OF THE MOVEMENT, Jan. 1957–Dec. 1958, 
208, 210 (Clayborne Carson et al., eds., 2000) (describing voting as a “sacred 
right,” and its denial as a “betrayal of the highest mandates of our democratic 
tradition”). 
12. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Addressing Internet Dangerous Expressions:
Deliberative Democracy and CleaNet©, 21 J. INTERNET L. 3, 5 (2018). 
13. James Madison’s Report to the Virginia House of Delegates, 1800, FIRST
AMENDMENT WATCH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://firstamendmentwatch.org/history-
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other words, elections presuppose more primordial democratic 
goods, the first of which is free speech, “the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”14   
As Benjamin Franklin said, “[f]reedom of speech is a principal 
pillar of a free government; when this support is taken away, the 
constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on 
its ruins.”15  The ancient progenitors of western self-government in 
classical Athens saw free speech as “virtually equivalent to 
democracy itself,”16 going so far as to say that democracy is “based 
on speech (politeia en logois).”17  Our democracy likewise cherishes 
bold public speech so that, through the forceful expression of 
diverse viewpoints, foolish recommendations might be discredited 
by juxtaposition with sage counsel, ignorance and hostility might 
give way to understanding and sympathy, and common rule might 
bring about the common good.18   
speaks-james-madisons-report-virginia-house-delegates-1800/#selfgovernance 
[perma.cc/44RV-UG8Y]. 
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
15. Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883, 891 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Benjamin Franklin, On Freedom of Speech and the Press, PA. GAZETTE (Nov. 
1737), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 285 (emphasis 
added)).  
16. Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom
of Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 298 (2008) (quoting Kurt A. Raaflaub, 
Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Greco-Roman World, in FREE SPEECH 
IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 41, 58 (Ineke Sluiter & Ralph M. Rosen eds., 2004)).   
17. Id. (quoting Emily Greenwood, Making Words Count: Freedom of
Speech and Narrative in Thucydides, in FREE SPEECH IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY, 
supra note 16, at 175–76). 
18. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).  In Cohen, the Court
highlighted the importance of free expression: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours.  It is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such 
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more 
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport 
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests.  
Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). 
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Indeed, free speech animates the very enterprise of self-
government, for it is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth.”19  The relevant “truth” here is political truth, i.e., 
approximate conclusions concerning the advantageous 
arrangement of common life.  Such conclusions are arrived at 
through debate, compromise, and experimentation, rather than 
necessary deduction from first principles, since political discourse 
deals with variable and contingent realities.20  This process 
necessarily puts a premium on the widespread diffusion of 
information and opinion.21  It also recommends an empirical and 
pragmatic mode of politics, which consists of testing ideas and 
leaders while assimilating data, in quasi-organic fashion, from the 
body politic’s multitudinous appendages.  “[R]ight conclusions are 
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.”22  The experimental 
dynamism that distinguishes democracy—especially America’s 
pluralistic liberal democracy—requires a thriving free speech 
culture, or else its investigative and innovative inclinations will 
atrophy. 
Moreover, free speech has a role in forming democratic citizens, 
who are not so much born as made—their political identities forged 
through participation in civic conversation.  By speaking aloud in 
the public square, an individual performs, and thereby internalizes, 
his or her sovereign identity.23  This internalization has profound 
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
20. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (c. 340 B.C.E.), reprinted in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 1025–27 (Richard McKeon ed., 2001). 
21. See Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of
Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1982). 
22. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).  But see JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RANGE OF 
REASON 166 (1953).  Maritain critiqued the supposed truism of free speech 
arriving at truth: 
One of the errors of individualist optimism was to believe in a free 
society “truth,” as to the foundations of civil life, as well as the 
decisions and modes of behavior befitting human dignity and freedom, 
would automatically emerge from the conflicts of individual forces and 
opinions supposedly immune from any irrational trends and 
disintegrating pressures. 
Id. 
23. See id. at 167–68.
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social ramifications.  The citizen’s realization of his or her freedom 
and power tends to produce the sort of vibrant pluralism often 
associated with democracy.24  Public speech must be unhindered in 
a democracy, lest the reality of self-rule, being not fully articulated, 
be not fully realized.25  Where the exuberant practice of free speech 
is lacking, democratic self-identity inevitably withers away as 
citizens forget that they are active participants in a project of self-
government, adopting instead the undemocratic roles of subject, 
consumer, and spectator.26  At that point, the great dream of 
democratic life—the formation of a body politic endowed with the 
“collective capacity to effect change in the public realm . . . [and] 
reconstitute the public realm through action”27—evaporates. 
Additionally, insofar as the human being is a political creature who 
24. See PLATO, REPUBLIC 296 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press,
1994) (375 B.C.E.).  In Republic, Socrates offers a compelling account of 
democracy’s “beauty” that is rather alluring to the modern American pluralist: 
[I]n the first place, the members of the community are
autonomous, aren’t they?  The community is informed by 
independence and freedom of speech, and everyone has the right to do 
as he chooses, doesn’t he?  
. . . . 
 And given this right, then clearly every individual can make for 
himself the kind of life which suits him. 
. . . . 
 I should think, then, that there’d be a wider variety of types of 
people in this society than in any other. 
. . . . 
It’s probably the most gorgeous political system there is . . . . Its 
beauty comes from the fact that it is adorned with every species of 
human trait, as a cloak might be adorned with every species of flower. 
Id.  Of course, Socrates’ reflection on democracy is hardly characterized by 
unalloyed praise (quite the contrary), and even the above words contain more 
than a trace of irony.  For a thoughtful study of Plato’s complicated view of 
democracy, see generally Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Democracy, Equality, and 
Eide: A Radical View from Book 8 of Plato’s Republic, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 273 
(1998).   
25. See PLATO, supra note 24, at 299–300.
26. See id. at 300–02.
27. Josiah Ober, The original meaning of “democracy”: Capacity to do
things, not majority rule 5 (Princeton/Standford Working Papers in Classics, 
Paper No. 090704, 2007), https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/
ober/090704.pdf [perma.cc/Y6A5-2TLC]. 
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finds dignity and meaning within political community,28 the failure 
of democratic citizenship ultimately hinders the realization of the 
person’s deepest aspirations.29   
Thus, for members of a democratic regime, free speech is 
essential to self-rule and self-fulfillment.30   
B. Isēgoria and Parrhēsia: Illuminating Internet Free Speech
The Greeks characterized free speech in terms of isēgoria and
parrhēsia.31  Despite their ancient vintage, these concepts have 
informed American speech-related jurisprudence and are helpful in 
comprehending our free speech tradition.32  Significantly, isēgoria 
and parrhēsia illumine the significance of digital fora in the 
continuing maturation of American democracy.   
For the purposes of this Comment, isēgoria indicates the 
democratic citizen’s “equal opportunity” to address public matters 
28. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1253a (Richard McKeon ed., 2011) (350 B.C.E.).
Aristotle described the political nature of man: 
[I]t is evident that . . . man is by nature a political animal. . . .
. . . . 
. . . [T]he individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore 
he is like a part in relation to the whole. . . .  [And] man, when 
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and 
justice, he is the worst of all . . . .  But justice is the bond of men in 
states, and the administration of justice . . . is the principle of order in 
political society. 
Id. 
29. See THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 19
(Richard J. Regan, trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc., 2007) (c. 1268–72). 
[P]olitical order brings human beings back to justice.  And the fact
that the Greeks call the order of the political community and the
standard of justice by the same term, namely, right order, makes this
clear.  And so it is obvious that the one who established the political
community kept human beings from being the worst and brought
them to the condition of being the best in justice and virtues.
Id. 
30. See Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican
Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 459 (1988).  This article is 
highly recommended because it indicates that the “republican” case for free 
speech was known and utilized by Justice Brandeis.  See id. at 460–61. 
31. Werhan, supra note 16, at 300.
32. See id. at 307–10 (tracing the influence of classical Athenian political
practice and theory on American free speech jurisprudence). 
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before his or her fellows, while parrhēsia indicates the democratic 
citizen’s rhetorical preference for “open[ ] and frank[ ]” speech.33  
Isēgoria reveals the egalitarian presuppositions of democratic free 
speech culture: the integrity of a democracy depends on the ability 
of every citizen to access and enter into the civic discourse.34  
Isēgoria also suggests the relationship between popular sovereignty 
and free speech, for it is precisely free speech that enables the 
people to “chart their collective course as a community.”35  For its 
part, parrhēsia bespeaks the “confrontative, critical” quality of free 
speech, even its tendency to be “crude, profane, or offensive.”36  
Americans value free speech precisely as a tool for challenging 
authority, disturbing convention, and expressing heterodox 
opinion.37  Parrhēsia has been called the “sound of freedom.”38  This 
sound is not always pleasant; sometimes it is quite harsh.39  But 
such is the “music of democracy”40: Forthright, fearless, 
disputatious, unsparing, unvarnished.41 Indeed, “verbal 
33. Id. at 300.
34. See id. at 301.
35. Id. at 309.
36. Id. at 316.
37. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (“[I]t is a prized
American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good 
taste.”). 
38. Werhan, supra note 16, at 318.
39. See Jonathan Simon, Parrhēsiastic Accountability: Investigatory
Commissions and Executive Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 
1421–22 (2005).  The confrontational nature of parrhēsia distinguishes it from 
gentler methods of persuasion.  See id.  Parrhēsia is akin to bitter medicine: it 
cures—but not without causing discomfort.  See id.  Parrhēsia typically 
involves courageous resistance to unjust authority.  See id. 
40. Judge Stephen H. Anderson, Law Day Address, 13 UTAH B.J. (2d ser.)
19, 20 (Sept. 2000) (speaking of “lawful protests, marches, meetings, speeches, 
demonstrations, and so on”); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 
(“To many, the immediate consequences of this freedom may often appear to 
be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.  These are, 
however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the 
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to 
achieve.”). 
41. See Mary Anne Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 294,
320–23, 331 (2019); Werhan, supra note 16, at 323, 325–26, 328–29.  Some 
distinguish “fearless speech” (i.e., parrhēsia) from “reckless speech” (speech 
that gratuitously offends, aggrieves, and incites).  See Franks, supra, at 331.  
Those who make this distinction reckon the hallmarks of parrhēsia to be 
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cacophony” may be a fine measure of a democracy’s health.42  
In summary, isēgoria refers to the democratic citizen’s right to 
access and shape civic discourse, while parrhēsia refers to the 
democratic citizen’s candid and confrontational manner of speaking 
in public.  
C. Democracy, Free Speech, and the Internet
The progress of democracy can often be measured by the
expanding circle of those entitled to speak.43  However, speaking 
serves no purpose—at least, no democratic purpose—if one’s voice 
is too feeble to be heard by other citizens.  In a small and egalitarian 
democracy, the right to speak is effectively the right to be heard.44  
But in a vast and unequal democracy, mere freedom of speech 
means little for purposes of self-government.45  In such a regime, 
the power of speech turns on access to means of communication.46  
Therefore, an evaluation of democratic integrity always involves an 
analysis of the means of popular communication, with special 
sincerity, criticism of power, and moral courage.  See id. at 320–23.  It is not 
clear how helpful this distinction is in practice.  First of all, irony (perhaps the 
opposite of sincerity) holds an important place in the free speech tradition 
(witness the figure of Socrates in much of the Platonic corpus).  See Werhan, 
supra note 16, at 323, 325–26.  Furthermore, the question of who holds power 
in society is often the very topic of parrhēsiastic discourse.  See id. at 326.  
Third, the American free speech tradition ennobles “provocative speech.”  See 
id. at 328–29; see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] 
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.  It 
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to 
anger.”).   
42. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
43. See Alina Rocha Menocal, What is a political voice, why does it matter,
and how can it bring about change?, ODI (May 2014), 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/8950.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HG4-Z8KV].  
44. Cf. Case Note, Constitutional Law—Freedom of Speech as Including
the Right to be Heard Through The Use of Amplifying Devices, 3 U. MIAMI L.Q. 
51, 51−52 (1948) (noting that courts have expanded the right of free speech 
explicitly to include the right to be heard). 
45. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).  
46. See Jennifer J. Lee, The Internet and First Amendment Values: Reno
v. ACLU and the Democratization of Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61,  61–62, 82 (1997).
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attention paid to the “conditions of communication . . . on the 
interplay of deliberative processes and informed public opinions.”47  
Today, the “conditions of communication” are defined by the 
digital revolution of the past few decades.  It is undeniable that the 
internet is—and will be—critical to the maturation of America’s 
democratic enterprise, for it magnifies the presence of the ordinary 
citizen in the political process by providing a cheap, convenient, and 
unintimidating platform for observing and participating in public 
discourse.48  Democratic legitimacy is fundamentally about the 
“authorship” of our common life,49 and the internet provides an 
unparalleled ability for citizens to contribute to the form, tone, and 
direction of that shared project.  On the internet, “[t]hrough the use 
of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier 
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox.”50  Although this language reflects archaic technology, it 
captures the isēgoriastic promise of the “vast democratic forums of 
the Internet,”51 where every American has the opportunity to relay 
his or her opinion to countless fellow citizens.  Additionally, the real 
and metaphorical distance afforded by the internet encourages 
parrhēsia.  Citizens will post comments to politicians’ social media 
accounts that they would likely never utter aloud and in person. 
Intimidating power relations are arguably attenuated online, 
allowing people to confront political, social, and economic leaders in 
47. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 12, at 5 (citing JURGEN HABERMAS, 
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 298 (1996)).  
48. See id.  Of course, a coin has two sides:
As the Internet provides cheap, virtually untraceable, instantaneous, 
anonymous, uncensored distribution that can be easily downloaded 
and posted in multiple places, it became an asset for terrorist 
organizations, criminals, hate groups, and other antisocial individuals 
who abuse the Internet to transmit propaganda and provide 
information about their aims, to allow an exchange between like-
minded individuals, to vindicate the use of violence, to delegitimize 
and to demoralize their enemies, to raise cash, to enlist public support 
and to promote violent conduct. 
Id.  
49. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L.
REV. 477, 482 (2011). 
50. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
51. Id. at 868.
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a manner that is critical and contemptuous.52  Moreover, there are 
certain sincerely held beliefs that individuals feel comfortable 
publicizing only in the virtual realm.  This digital fearlessness—
albeit occasionally misguided and intemperate—is facilitated by 
the mask of anonymity, which is a venerable part of the American 
free speech tradition.53  Finally, the ease of accessing online 
discourse mitigates structural obstacles inherent to traditional 
modes of discussion that have long disadvantaged minority 
communities (for instance, the physically disabled).54  
Social media platforms are the frontier of democratic free 
speech culture: sprawling cyber-commons where millions of 
Americans argue, organize, and collaborate, while subjecting 
members of the social, political, and economic elite to scrutiny and 
censure.  The process is not tidy.  All the prejudices and passions of 
the “real world” exist online.  Nevertheless, the major social media 
platforms—Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook—provide 
extraordinary opportunities for isēgoriastic and parrhēsiastic 
expression by providing every citizen a soapbox in an atmosphere 
that encourages bold, disruptive, and creative speech.  One 
commentator noted: “[e]quipped with social media, the citizen no 
longer has to be a passive consumer of political party propaganda, 
government spin or mass media news, but is instead actually 
enabled to challenge discources [sic], share alternative perspectives 
52. See Angelo Antoci, Alexia Delfino, Fabio Paglieri, Fabrizio Panebianco
& Fabio Sabatini, Civility vs. Incivility in Online Social Interactions: An 
Evolutionary Approach, PLOS ONE (Nov. 1, 2016),  https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0164286 [https://perma.cc/CP7N-
ARR2]. 
53. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(citation omitted):  
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a 
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy 
and of dissent.  Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. 
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the 
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from 
retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an 
intolerant society. 
Id. 
54. See Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004). 
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and publish their own opinions.”55  
In short, social media platforms, by their very structure, tend 
to foster the open-ended, confrontational, and improvisational 
conversations that animate authentic democracies.  Despite the 
undeniable prevalence of hate speech, misinformation, and sheer 
nonsense, the proverbial uploading of public deliberation to social 
media has created a richer, more inclusive, and more egalitarian 
discourse.56  Across the major social media platforms, Americans 
daily enact democracy by trading and testing ideas,57 diffusing 
information,58 provoking controversy,59 critiquing power,60 and 
expressing beliefs and preferences.61   
D. Social Media Speech Suppression: Lurking Peril to Democracy
The Supreme Court has declared that a lively free speech
culture requires “that all persons have access to places where they 
can speak and listen,” and the Court has further identified social 
media as the “most important place[ ]” where this discursive 
exercise transpires.62  Therefore, given the connection between free 
speech and democracy, suppression of political speech on the major 
social media platforms represents a threat to democracy itself.  The 
threat to democracy will only grow more acute as human 
interaction is further digitized over the coming decades.   
55. Brian D. Loader & Dan Mercea, Networking Democracy? Social media
innovations in participatory politics, 14 INFO., COMM. AND SOC’Y 757, 759 
(2011). 
56. See Ari Armstrong, The Egalitarian Assault on Free Speech, OBJECTIVE
STANDARD (Oct. 18, 2012), https://theobjectivestandard.com/2012/10/the-
egalitarian-assault-on-free-speech/ [perma.cc/FC4L-PN78]. 
57. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). 
58. See First Nat’l. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
59. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
60. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
61. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
62. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
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The existence of politically-biased content moderation remains 
hotly disputed.63  This Comment does not attempt to definitively 
answer the question of whether the major social media platforms 
are intentionally engaged in campaigns of selective speech 
suppression.  However, this Comment does maintain that, given the 
increasing transfer of civic life to online fora, our democratic society 
would be wise to proactively discourage censorship and encourage 
a culture of robust free speech.  
One cannot deny that the major social media companies have 
the technological means to easily suppress speech with which they 
disagree.  With the click of a button, YouTube can demonetize a 
channel, Facebook can suspend an account, and Twitter can limit 
the visibility of content to other users on the platform.64  The recent 
presidential election featured at least one remarkable (and 
63. See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, The Myth of Social Media Anti-Conservative
Bias Refuses to Die, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/platform-bias.php [perma.cc/9EHZ-
2NAE] (denying systematic anti-conservative bias).  But see, e.g.,  Kate Conger 
& Sheera Frenkel, Dozens at Facebook Unite to Challenge Its ‘Intolerant ‘ 
Liberal Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/technology/inside-facebook-employees-
political-bias.html [perma.cc/ENG6-W27E] (showing internal resistance to an 
alleged liberal “political monoculture” in Facebook, although not speaking 
directly to systematic bias by algorithm or human moderation); Kurt Wagner, 
Twitter is So Liberal That Its Conservative Employees ‘Don’t Feel Safe to 
Express Their Opinions,’ says CEO Jack Dorsey, VOX (last updated Sept. 14, 
2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/14/17857622/twitter-liberal-employees-
conservative-trump-politics [https://perma.cc/9YJN-WRAC] (indicating 
alleged political bias at Twitter).  For a more evenhanded analysis of variation 
within tech industry political cultures, see Sean Captain, Politics Are Tearing 
Tech Companies Apart, Says New Study, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90313045/politics-are-tearing-tech-companies-
apart-says-new-survey [perma.cc/BT74-SZSL]. 
64. See, e.g., The YouTube Team, Our Ongoing Work to Tackle Hate,
YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (June 5, 2019), https://blog.youtube/news-and-
events/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate [perma.cc/65CE-GU6B] (explaining 
demonetization as an enforcement mechanism for violations of YouTube’s hate 
speech policies); Disabled Accounts, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/185747581553788 [https://perma.cc/73CF-
J29E] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (explaining disabling of an account, with 
possible reinstatement, for not following the Facebook Terms); Our Range of 
Enforcement Options, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/enforcement-options [perma.cc/3234-MY7R] (last visited Jan. 13, 
2021) (explaining that enforcement for violation of Twitter’s rules and policies 
may include limiting tweet visibility and hiding a tweet while awaiting its 
removal). 
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controversial) exercise of this power.65  It is worrying that the 
intellectual marketplace is increasingly consigned to the hidden 
hands of a few corporations, especially when their employees 
reportedly support causes and candidates of one political faction by 
a large margin.66  Of course, nothing unseemly can necessarily be 
inferred from lopsided, but otherwise legitimate, participation in 
the political process.  Still, it remains the case that these private 
actors are effectively entrusted with guardianship of the public 
discourse with minimal democratic oversight.67  Right now, citizens 
can only depend on the platforms’ good faith.  Such reliance 
contradicts two principles of American political order: first, freedom 
is not secure if it rests on the mere benevolence of those in charge; 
second, unsupervised power inevitably runs amok.68   
65. See Shannon Bond, Facebook and Twitter Limit Sharing ‘New York
Post’ Story About Joe Biden, NPR (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/
10/14/923766097/facebook-and-twitter-limit-sharing-new-york-post-story-
about-joe-biden [perma.cc/YK65-9ZZK].  Twitter’s ability to effortlessly color 
public discourse is also evident in the “warning labels” it has affixed to many 
of President Trump’s Tweets, which allegedly contain disputed or misleading 
information.  See Cat Zakrewski, The Technology 202: Trump’s Twitter feed is 
covered in warning labels, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/05/technology-202-trump-
twitter-feed-is-covered-warning-labels/ [perma.cc/2RG9-NF5U]. 
66. See Robert Gearty, Google, Facebook and Twitter Staffs Splurge on
Democrats Ahead of Midterms, FOX NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/google-facebook-and-twitter-staffs-splurge-on-
democrats-ahead-of-midterms [perma.cc/4PTP-MRCF]; Ari Levy, A Shockingly 
Small Number of People Donated to Trump at Facebook and Twitter, CNBC 
(Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/03/trump-love-twitter-and-
facebook-goes-unrequited.html [https://perma.cc/KZC4-6BUC]. 
67. Helena Rosenblatt & Vasant Dhar, Opinion, Social-media platforms
are undermining our democracy. Lawmakers need to step up to protect it., BUS. 
INSIDER (Sep. 17, 2020, 8:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/social-
media-platforms-facebook-google-twitter-undermining-democracy-2020-9 
[perma.cc/VCP4-XLUJ]. 
68. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro
ed., Yale Univ. Press 2009).  James Madison famously argued in support of the 
Constitution: 
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government.  But what is 
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were 
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary.  In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
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Given the ever-growing importance of social media platforms 
to our democratic project, careful oversight and regulation of these 
entities is more than justified.  ESICA offers a creative means of 
ensuring that the platforms remain open and available to all 
citizens.  
II. ESICA: PROTECTING THE PROMISE OF THE INTERNET’S “VAST
DEMOCRATIC FORUMS” 
In Part I, this Comment assessed the relationships between 
free speech, democracy, and the internet.  It also considered the 
threat to free speech—and consequently to democracy—posed by 
potentially politically-biased content moderation on the major 
social media platforms.  It will now explore a possible solution to 
this threat: ESICA.69  Simply put, ESICA would help secure a 
robust culture of democratic free speech on the internet by 
predicating Section 230 immunities on politically neutral content 
moderation policies.  To appreciate what this solution means, it is 
necessary to review the history and substance of Section 230.70  
A. The Origins of Section 230
One who publishes a false and injurious communication about
another is liable for defamation.71  Generally, one who repeats a 
defamation is as liable as the original publisher.72  However, the 
law of torts generally exempts from liability one who acts as a “mere 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the 
next place oblige it to control itself. 
Id. 
 69.  See S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FP38-4DU8] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 
70. For useful background and perspective on Section 230, as well as an
extended reflection on its relation to the First Amendment, see Note, Section 
230 As First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (2018). 
71. DAN B. DOBBS,  PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 519 (2d ed. 2011) (defining defamation at common law and describing 
its constitutional limitations).  A publication is “any communication, by any 
method, to one or more persons who can understand the meaning,” whether 
intentional or negligent, including a failure to remove or prevent such a 
publication.  Id. at § 520. 
72. Id. § 521.
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conduit” in the circulation of defamation.73  A conduit—also called 
a distributor—is characterized by its “attenuated or mechanical” 
transmission of offending material.74  Traditionally, a distributor is 
subject to liability only if it knows, or should know, that it is 
reproducing defamation.75  Bookstores are archetypal 
distributors76 while newspapers are archetypal publishers,77 even 
as to content prepared by third parties (e.g., advertisements).78   
With the advent of the digital revolution, courts had to 
determine whether internet services should be considered 
publishers or distributors for the purpose of defamation liability.79  
Ultimately, a lot rested on this classification: not only black-and-
white matters of legal exposure, but arguably the very character of 
cyberspace.80 
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the Southern District of 
New York heard a case arising from the publication of defamatory 
material by a third party to an electronic forum maintained by 
defendant CompuServe.81  CompuServe hosted more than one 
hundred and fifty similar forums.82  Because CompuServe exerted 
minimal editorial control and processed a high volume of content, 
73. Id.
74. Id. § 522.
75. Id.
76. See generally Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).  Other well-
established distributors include “telegraph and telephone companies, libraries 
and news vendors.”  DOBBS ET AL., supra note 71, § 522. 
77. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)
(treating appellant newspaper as a publisher in a First Amendment analysis). 
78. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 71, § 522.
79. A brisk survey of this history is offered in Note, supra note 70, at 2028.
80. For Section 230’s role in the development of vibrant internet culture,
see id. at 2027, n.2.  See also Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 
63 EMORY L.J. 639, 653 (2014).   
81. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  At
that time, CompuServe was a leading internet provider.  Peter H. Lewis, The 
Compuserve Edge: Delicate Data Balance, N.Y. TIMES (November 29, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/29/science/personal-computers-the-
compuserve-edge-delicate-data-balance.html [perma.cc/GS4F-B6GY].  Not 
long after Cubby, it was crowned one of the “Big Three information services,” 
alongside Prodigy and America Online.  Id.  Prodigy takes center stage in the 
next case reviewed by this Comment. 
82. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
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the court likened CompuServe to a library or news vendor83 and, 
therefore, held that it was a distributor subject to liability only if it 
knew or should have known about the defamatory statements.84 
Four years later, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co., the New York Superior Court examined a similar case but 
reached a different result.85  Stratton Oakmont also sprang from 
defamatory third-party content posted to an online bulletin board.86  
However, while the Cubby court found CompuServe to be a 
distributor, the Stratton Oakmont court found Prodigy to be a 
publisher.87  Unlike CompuServe, Prodigy explicitly embraced a 
policy of supervising and moderating content, going so far as to 
compare itself to a traditional newspaper.88  The court reasoned 
that Prodigy’s “conscious choice to gain the benefits of editorial 
control ha[d] opened it up to greater liability.”89 
Taken together, Cubby and Stratton Oakmont presented 
something of a paradox.  If an internet service refrained from 
content moderation, it risked creating an environment conducive to 
vulgar, offensive, and malicious speech, yet it enjoyed significant 
immunity from liability; on the other hand, if an internet service 
engaged in content moderation, it could cultivate a hospitable and 
orderly environment, yet it exposed itself to considerable liability. 
This dilemma led to widespread consternation.90  In the wake of 
these decisions, a prominent industry lawyer opined that the 
83. Id. at 140.  As the Cubby court explained:
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more 
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower 
standard of liability to an electronic news distributor such as 
CompuServe than that which is applied to a public library, book store, 
or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of 
information. 
 Id. 
84. Id. at 140–41.
85. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).  
86. Id.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. at *5.
90. See Jessica R. Friedman, Defamation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 794, 799
nn.580–82 (1995). 
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distinction was “[l]ikely to be short-lived.”91  The lawyer’s 
prediction proved prescient. 
Congressman Chris Cox learned about the Stratton Oakmont 
decision shortly after it was handed down.92  It occurred to him that 
the ruling would disincentivize internet services from policing 
content, rendering cyberspace a “cesspool.”93  Cox immediately 
initiated a legislative effort to protect the well-being of the infant 
digital world, lest it be smothered in the cradle.94  This effort, which 
was shepherded through the upper chamber by Senator Ron 
Wyden, culminated in 1996 with the bipartisan passage of Section 
509 of the Communications Decency Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230.95  Wyden later explained that “the goal [of Section 230] was
to protect the unique ability of the Internet to be the proverbial
marketplace of ideas while ensuring that mainstream sites could
reflect the ethics of society as a whole.”96  Simply put, Section 230
aimed to grant traditional distributor immunity to internet services
without depriving them of the editorial oversight typically
associated with publishers.97
91. Id. at 799 n.580 (quoting Kent D. Stuckey, Rights and Responsibilities
of Information Service Providers, in BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
INTERNET & ONLINE SERVICES 203, 220 (Lance Rose & Shari Steele eds., 1995)). 
92. Mark Sullivan, The 1996 law that made the web is in the crosshairs,
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/
maybe-its-time-to-take-away-the-outdated-loophole-that-big-tech-exploits 
[perma.cc/KLN9-426T]. 
93. Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google,





95. The Supreme Court struck down portions of the Communications
Decency Act in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878–79 (1997).  Additionally, 
Congress recently amended Section 230 to remove potential safe harbors for 
internet services that facilitate sex trafficking.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). 
96. Ron Wyden, The Consequences of Indecency, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 23,
2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/23/the-consequences-of-indecency/ 
[perma.cc/6E5M-2TLS]. 
97. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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B. The Scope and Substance of Section 230
Section 230 establishes that “no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information by another information content 
provider.”98  Furthermore, the statute removes liability from any 
“provider or user of an interactive computer service” who “in good 
faith . . . restrict[s] access to or availability of material” deemed 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.”99  
In the years since Congress passed Section 230, state and 
federal courts have dramatically enlarged the scope of the 
immunity it provides.  For instance, in Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc., the Fourth Circuit precluded even the application of 
traditional notice-based distributor liability, reasoning that 
Congress intended to encourage “unfettered speech on the 
Internet.”100  Subsequent holdings extended Section 230 bit by bit, 
so that today it is thought to overcome almost any claim relating to 
third-party content, defeating causes of action ranging from 
interference with contract to computer fraud.101 
98. Id.  An “interactive computer service” means “any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  Id. § 230(f)(2).  
99. Id. § 230(c)(2).
100. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997).  See also
id. at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any 
cause of action that would make service providers liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.”).  
101. See Chander, supra note 80, at 653 n.58 (cataloguing cases); see also
Michal Lavi, Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network 
Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 869 (2016) 
(“After Zeran, [Section] 230 repeatedly shielded web enterprises from lawsuits 
in a plethora of cases.  Courts have found that content providers that host 
harmful content are immune to liability, even if they failed to screen harmful 
content, and even after being notified of the harmful content.”  (footnotes 
omitted)).  The Supreme Court has yet to determine the contours of Section 
230, although Justice Thomas recently critiqued lower courts for interpreting 
the statute overbroadly.  See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. 
USA, L.L.C., No. 19–1284, slip op. at 6–7 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari).   
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In short, providers now enjoy extraordinary risk-free 
discretion.  Whether they fastidiously moderate content or let 
anarchy reign, they are shielded from potentially fatal lawsuits by 
the sturdy bulwark of Section 230. 
C. Section 230 Under Fire
 Despite widespread praise from tech advocates and repeated 
success in the courts, Section 230 has lately come under fire from 
liberals and conservatives alike.102  Liberal criticism generally 
assumes two forms.  First, there are those who argue that the free 
speech culture enabled by Section 230 allows hateful ideas to thrive 
in cyberspace, fortifying inequitable power dynamics and 
motivating violence against peripheral communities.103  In this 
view, online speech, far from being “free,” comes at the expense of 
marginalized peoples: “First Amendment advocates will often just 
assume that it’s okay for black and brown people to bear the brunt 
102. This is not to say that Section 230 is without supporters on both wings
of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the negative response of some liberals 
and conservatives to President Trump’s May 2020 Executive Order on 
Preventing Online Censorship.  See Peter Baker & Daisuke Wakabayashi, 
Trump’s Order on Social Media Could Harm One Person in Particular: Donald 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/trump-jack-dorsey.html 
[perma.cc/V9Z4-GPAD] (note particularly the comments of Kate Ruane of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and Patrick Hedger of the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute); see also infra note 207. Indeed, some of the most spirited 
defenses of Section 230 have come from the right.  See, e.g., David French, 
Section 230: Donald Trump v. Twitter, THE DISPATCH (May 29, 2020), 
https://thedispatch.com/p/section-230-donald-trump-vs-twitter 
[perma.cc/F95E-PM75] (writing in the context of President Trump’s executive 
order). 
103. See Andrew Marantz, Free Speech Is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-
social-media-violence.html [perma.cc/CJD5-BEHW] (advocating a 
reassessment of online free speech culture, including a “rethinking” of Section 
230, in light of purported real world consequences).  But see Elizabeth Nolan 
Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First Amendment.  Now Both Republicans 
and Democrats Want To Take It Away, REASON (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-
now-both-republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/ 
[https://perma.cc/SX5G-9T46] (“Ending or amending Section 230 wouldn’t 
make life difficult just for Google, Facebook, Twitter, and the rest of today’s 
biggest online platforms.  Eroding the law would seriously jeopardize free 
speech for everyone, particularly marginalized groups whose ideas don’t sit 
easily with the mainstream.”). 
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of white free speech.”104  Second, there are those who believe that 
the social media giants have failed to adequately guard the gates of 
American democracy, using Section 230 as an excuse to act 
negligently in the face of foreign election meddling and domestic 
misinformation campaigns.  For instance, then Senator, and now 
Vice President, Kamala Harris promised to hold “accountable” 
those platforms “act[ing] as a megaphone for misinformation or 
cyberwarfare.”105  And Speaker Nancy Pelosi warned that Section 
230 is a “privilege” that “could be removed.”106  Perhaps most 
importantly, President Joe Biden has straightforwardly stated that 
Section 230 “should be revoked, immediately,” framing his 
opposition in terms of fairness and responsibility.107  
Conservative criticism of Section 230 is rooted in the 
widespread conviction that the major social media platforms are 
biased against right-wing users.108  Conservatives are especially 
suspicious of Twitter, which some charge with undertaking covert 
104. Elie Mystal, Alex Jones Has Been Banned…Let’s See If Free Speech
Still Exists, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 7, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/
08/alex-jones-has-been-banned-lets-check-if-free-speech-still-exists/ 
[https://perma.cc/F2RL-WX6W]. 
105. See Ryan Brooks, Democrats Running For President Say Social Media
Companies Have A White Nationalist Problem.  Some Think Regulation Should 
Be The Answer, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 21, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.
com/article/ryancbrooks/2020-regulate-social-media-white-nationalism-
facebook [perma.cc/S9G2-QRAT].  
106. Transcript of Nancy Pelosi’s interview with Kara Swisher,




107. The New York Times Editorial Board, Interview with Joe Biden, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-
interview.html [perma.cc/GAF6-HNBU]. 
108. See Jessica Guynn, Ted Cruz threatens to regulate Facebook, Google,
and Twitter over charges of anti-conservative bias, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 
2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/04/10/ted-cruz-threatens-
regulate-facebook-twitter-over-alleged-bias/3423095002/ [perma.cc/4HTK-
WEYS]; see also Matt Clinch, Trump claims social media firms are 
discriminating against conservative voices, CNBC (Aug. 18, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/18/trump-claims-social-media-firms-are-
discriminating-against-conservative-voices.html [perma.cc/P699-MALT]. 
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“shadow banning” campaigns.109  Undoubtedly, the conservative 
critique stems partly from a generalized mistrust of the corporate 
goliaths of digital communication, which are viewed as elite 
institutions captive to the liberal agenda: “Big Tech undoubtedly is 
. . . run by left-wing political activists who, similar to deep state 
operatives within the U.S. government, want to stop President 
Trump from getting reelected.”110  President Trump has channeled 
the collective frustration of conservatives by publicly calling for the 
revocation of Section 230.111  
Hawley introduced ESICA within this context of bipartisan 
concern about the power and influence of major social media 
platforms.  The bill aims to ensure that online political discourse is 
fair, transparent, and characterized by accountability.112  It would 
obtain this result by predicating Section 230 immunity on 
politically unbiased content moderation.   
D. The Proposal: Predicated Immunity Under ESICA
Under ESICA, interactive computer services of a certain size or
profitability—“covered companies”113—would no longer enjoy 
109. See Liam Stack, What Is a ‘Shadow Ban,’ and Is Twitter Doing It to
Republican Accounts?, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/us/politics/twitter-shadowbanning.html 
[perma.cc/LEE2-CBK3]. 
110. Adriana Cohen, Big Tech Cuts Out Conservatives, REALCLEAR POLITICS
(May 10, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/05/10/big_
tech_cuts_out_conservatives_140296.html [perma.cc/V9YV-ZCHK].  
111. See sources cited supra note 2.  Conservative suspicion of Big Tech and
hostility toward Section 230 has only increased in the aftermath of the 2020 
general elections.  See, e.g., Jaclyn Diaz, Trump Vows To Veto Defense Bill 
Unless Shield For Big Tech Is Scrapped, NPR (Dec. 2, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/02/941019533/trump-vows-to-veto-defense-bill-
unless-shield-for-big-tech-is-scrapped [perma.cc/2WRZ-J9XQ]; Francesca 
Tripodi, Conservatives Are Gearing Up to Falsely Blame Big Tech Censorship 
for Trump’s Loss, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/11/big-tech-conservative-bias-trump-
election-voter-suppression.html [perma.cc/HEH6-6FUP]. 
112. Press Release, Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend
Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies, U.S. SENATE (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-
section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [perma.cc/RQD4-WT2F]. 
113. See generally S. 1914, 116th Cong. sec. 2(a)(2) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J49Y-TF9E] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).  
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Section 230 immunity by default.114  Instead, such entities would 
enjoy Section 230 immunity by acquiring an “immunity 
certification” from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).115  The 
FTC would give immunity certifications upon a showing of 
politically unbiased content moderation.116  Moderation would be 
deemed biased if:  
[It] is designed to negatively affect a political party, 
political candidate, or political viewpoint; or 
disproportionately restricts or promotes access to, or the 
availability of, information from a political party, political 
candidate, or political viewpoint; or [if] an officer or 
employee of the provider makes a decision about 
moderating information provided by other information 
content providers that is motivated by an intent to 
negatively affect a political party, political candidate, or 
political viewpoint.117 
Moderation that might otherwise be biased within the meaning of 
the statute would be permitted if “necessary for business,” or if the 
target content is not “protected under the First Amendment . . . 
[and] there is no available alternative that has a less 
disproportionate effect, and the provider does not act with the 
intent to discriminate based on political [affiliation, party, or 
viewpoint].”118 
114. See id. sec. 2(a)(1).  All of the major social media platforms would
qualify as covered companies.  See Dustin W. Stout, Social Media Statistics 
2020: Top Networks By the Numbers, DUSTIN STOUT BLOG 
https://dustinstout.com/social-media-statistics/#twitter-stats [perma.cc/SGQ6-
SGE4] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
115. S. 1914, 116th Cong. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(A), (B) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf 
[perma.cc/N7K8-ZQMB] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
116. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(A).  For a definition of “moderate,” see id. sec.
2(a)(2), § (f)(6) (note that it includes both human and algorithmic moderation). 
117. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(ii).
118. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(iii)(I).  Business necessity is defined as a
“lawful act that advances the growth, development, or profitability of a 
company but does not include any action designed to appeal to, or gain favor 
from, persons or groups because of their political beliefs, political party 
membership, or support for political candidates.”  Id. sec. 2(a)(2), §(f)(7).  
Presumably, this exception would permit the moderation of content that runs 
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Covered companies would be required to go before the FTC 
every two years119 and demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that, during the preceding period, they had engaged in 
politically neutral content moderation.120  The certification process 
would invite public input.121  Dissenting opinions with respect to 
certification would be published.122  Costs of certification would be 
borne by the applicant.123 
E. Criticism of ESICA
Since its release, ESICA has received significant criticism.
Some of this criticism is misguided, insofar as it focuses on Hawley’s 
purported belief that Section 230 immunity was motivated 
primarily by a commitment to “true diversity of political [opinion]” 
online.124  If this is indeed Hawley’s opinion—and it is the opinion 
of some conservatives125—it seems not to be wholly accurate. 
Although Congress wished to protect the open exchange of ideas,126 
a goal recognized by the courts,127 Section 230 was not 
fundamentally concerned with viewpoint diversity online.128  
Whatever Hawley’s personal perspective, ESICA is mute as to the 
original meaning of Section 230.129 
Other criticism focuses on the practical effects of ESICA.  Some 
critics fear that the removal of Section 230 immunity would: (1) 
create a cataclysmic deluge of moderation requests, (2) lead to over-
 
afoul of typical terms of service agreements, such as harassing behavior, 
abusive language, or criminality.  
119. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(C)(i).
120. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(i)(III).
121. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(iv)(IV).
122. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(iv)(III).
123. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(D)(i).
124. See Brown, supra note 103.
125. See generally Elliott Harmon, No, Section 230 Does Not Require
Platforms to Be “Neutral,” ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/no-section-230-does-not-require-
platforms-be-neutral [perma.cc/TC4Q-B9NK]. 
126. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
127. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997).
128. See supra Section II.B.
129. S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/
s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf. 
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policing of content, and/or (3) enable bad actors to suppress the 
speech of opponents through cynical manipulation.130  Of course, 
such nightmare scenarios presume that the major social media 
platforms would fail to render their content moderation policies 
ESICA compliant—a dubious conjecture.  Still other critics have 
reacted negatively to ESICA due to anxiety about overweening 
federal regulators who would, far from eliminating bias, simply 
entrench their own biases.131  Finally, some critics have noted that 
ESICA sweeps in many platforms that have no relation to the 
purported problem of politically biased content moderation, 
unnecessarily burdening important players in online recreation 
(Twitch) and commerce (eBay).132  
Such objections are worthy of serious reflection.  However, this 
Comment will restrict itself to tackling a constitutional objection: 
specifically, that ESICA compels speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.133 
III. ESICA—SECURING, NOT COMPELLING, FREE SPEECH ONLINE
The compelled speech case against ESICA runs as follows.  The 
bill predicates a critical government benefit on adherence to a 
government-mandated moderation policy, forcing covered 
companies to adopt a potentially disagreeable content curation 
policy or face ruinous legal and financial consequences.  While not 
an unreasonable argument, this Comment contends that ESICA is 
130. See Brown, supra note 103.  One commentator argued:
Without Section 230, companies would thus be more likely to simply 
delete all user-flagged content, whether the report has merit or not, 
or at least immediately hide reported content as a review proceeds. 
It’s easy to imagine massive backlogs of challenged content, much of 
it flagged strategically by bad actors for reasons having nothing to do 
with either safety or veracity.  Silencing one’s opponents would be 
easy. 
Id. 
131. Hawley Proposes a Fairness Doctrine for the Internet, TECH FREEDOM
(June 19, 2019), https://techfreedom.org/hawley-proposes-a-fairness-doctrine-
for-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/6C9S-8MCC]. 
132. See Goldman, supra note 8.
133. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., How Conservatives’ Campaign to
Impose Political Neutrality Regulation on Big Tech Will Backfire, FORBES (Dec. 
23, 2019, 1:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2019/12/23/how-
conservatives-effort-to-impose-political-neutrality-regulation-on-big-tech-will-
backfire/ [perma.cc/C9WN-NCEY]. 
186 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:160 
fundamentally dissimilar to laws that have been struck down for 
impermissibly compelling speech and that it therefore has a decent 
chance of escaping a constitutional challenge from the major social 
media platforms on this basis. 
A. An Overview of Compelled Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”134  This constitutional 
guarantee not only protects the right to speak, but also the right 
not to speak:  “[S]peech compulsions . . . are as constitutionally 
suspect as . . . speech restrictions.”135  Indeed, perhaps the “cardinal 
constitutional command”136 is that “no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.”137   
Although the Free Speech Clause is simple on its face, it has 
produced a doctrinal “labyrinth.”138  In traditional speech restraint 
analysis (i.e., analysis concerning direct curtailment of speech), the 
chief concern is preventing “purposeful government censorship”139 
and the primary inquiry is whether a government regulation is 
content-based or content-neutral.140  A regulation is content-based 
if it explicitly identifies speech based on the “ideas or messages it 
express[es].”141  Such regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and 
only pass constitutional muster if the government can demonstrate 
134. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TX. L. REV. 355, 355
(2018).  This Comment makes appreciative use of Professor Volokh’s compelled 
speech framework. 
136. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018).
137. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
138. Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the
Speech Clause with A Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 
225 (2000). 
139. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments, 
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 123, 127 (1999). 
140. See id. at 126–29.
141. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).  A regulation is
also content-based if, while facially neutral, it can only be explained by 
“reference to the regulated speech,” or if it was implemented based on 
government disapproval of its content.  Id. 
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that they are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.”142  On the other hand, a regulation of speech is content-
neutral if it “confer[s] benefits or imposes burdens on speech 
without reference to the ideas or views expressed.”143  Such 
regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which means that 
they will be upheld if the government can show that they further 
an “important or substantial governmental interest . . . unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression[,] and if the incidental 
restriction of alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than 
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”144   
Speech restraint doctrine is complicated but (relatively) 
coherent.  Contrarily, compelled speech doctrine is “a patchwork of 
cases with no clear thread that ties them together.”145  Although 
the Court has applied some of the concepts and terminology of the 
former to the latter, the transposition has been inconsistent at 
best,146 with the Court often justifying its decisions with “seemingly 
case-specific distinctions and analogies” and “highly debatable 
142. Id. at 2226.
143. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).  “The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the 
government has adopted a regulation . . . because of disagreement with [its] 
message.”  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  Content 
neutral laws are typified by regulation of the “time, place, and manner” of 
speech, regardless of its content.  Id. 
144. Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.  Other routine inquiries examine where the
relevant speech occurs, whether the speech falls into an unprotected category, 
whether the speech involves a commercial transaction, and the whether the 
state is speaking or subsidizing speech.  See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The 
First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 
395, 403–04 (2014); see also Jacobs, supra note 139, at 129. 
145. Jacobs, supra note 139, at 125.
146. For instance, the Court has identified certain compelled speech laws
as content-based and applied strict scrutiny thereto.  See Nat’l Inst. of Family 
& Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374−78 (2018) (striking down a 
regulation requiring pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to post state-drafted 
notifications about publicly-funded abortions).  Yet, it has dealt with seemingly 
similar laws without describing them as content-based or expressly applying 
strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 (1977) 
(striking down laws requiring vehicles to display license plate with 
philosophically-charged state motto—“Live Free or Die”—and penalizing any 
defacement of words on said plates).  Indeed, Wooley leaned on two cases 
employing intermediate scrutiny.  See Jacobs, supra note 139, at 140. 
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factual judgments.”147  Even where the Court has applied the 
language of speech restraint jurisprudence, it has often imbued that 
language with different meaning.148  Thus, while the general 
outline of compelled speech jurisprudence may be settled, “its 
details are often hard to pin down” and “major uncertainties” and 
“internal tensions” abound.149  
Ultimately, compelled speech analysis is a fact-intensive 
process that involves not the application of a single test, but 
multiple distinct yet interrelated inquiries150 informed by broad 
principles derived from “clusters of holdings.”151  These principles 
are in turn derived from a hodgepodge of landmark cases, some 
with idiosyncratic fact patterns, which this Comment will now 
consider.  
B. Compelled Speech: Landmarks and Principles
Compelled speech laws can be divided into two categories:
speech compulsions as speech restrictions and pure speech 
compulsions.152 
Speech compulsions are speech restrictions when government 
laws have the effect of curbing, limiting, or otherwise preventing a 
person from speaking as he or she would have spoken but for the 
compelled speech regulation.153   
A law requiring newspapers to print replies from individuals 
criticized in its pages falls into this bucket.  In Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court knocked down such a “right-
of-access” statute, reasoning that it ran roughshod over editorial 
discretion and imposed economic penalties for publishing content 
147. Id. at 138.
148. Id. at 125 (“[W]hile the labels are the same, their meanings and
apparent significance in constitutional analysis are not.  For example, 
although the Court purports to evaluate whether compelled expression 
requirements are ‘content-based,’ it has attached at least four different 
meanings to the label.”). 
149. Volokh, supra note 135, at 356–57.
150. Jacobs, supra note 139, at 162–63.
151. Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. 
L. REV. 847, 850 (2011) (describing compelled speech doctrine as “sprawling
and ungainly”).
152. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 358.
153. See generally id. at 359–366.
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critical of public figures, thus chilling civic discourse.154  Similarly, 
the Court held unconstitutional a state regulator’s order requiring 
a utility to occasionally include in its mass mailings a newsletter 
prepared by an adversarial interest group.155  The Court reasoned 
that, as in Tornillo, the order forced the utility to “associate” with 
disagreeable opinions and bear the costs of distributing the same, 
thereby presenting the risk that it might simply “avoid controversy” 
rather than “disseminate hostile views.”156 
A government speech compulsion also serves to impermissibly 
restrict speech where it forces a speaker to incorporate some 
undesirable element into a “coherent speech product.”157  In Hurley 
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
the Court observed that a parade is an expressive act comprised of
multiple meaningful units (floats, banners, uniformed contingents,
etc.), each with its own meaning, and the Court therefore held that
the forced inclusion of a unit communicating beliefs repugnant to
the parade’s organizers unacceptably infringed on their “autonomy
to choose the content of their own message.”158  Likewise, in
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),
the Court found that a law requiring pro-life crisis pregnancy
centers to post or distribute a state-drafted information sheet
concerning government-funded abortion opportunities ran afoul of
First Amendment guarantees because it “alter[ed] the content” of
the centers’ speech.159  Hurley and NIFLA stand for the proposition
that speech is sometimes an aggregative phenomenon consisting of
many discrete communicative units.160  Where speech is
aggregative, the compelled inclusion of a disagreeable
communicative unit has the potential to change the whole gist of
154. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1974).
155. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20
(1986). 
156. Id. at 13–15.
157. Volokh, supra note 135, at 361.
158. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995). 
159. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018). 
160. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 363.
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the message and is therefore suspect on First Amendment 
grounds.161   
However, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights (FAIR), the Court considered a law that required schools to 
afford equal access to military recruiters on campus or risk losing 
federal funds.162  Some schools protested that facilitating 
recruitment entailed speech acts, such as posting signs and sending 
e-mails.163  The Court reasoned that the accommodation of military
recruiters was not “inherently expressive,” and that any incidental
communication did not appreciably “interfere with any message
from the school[s]” as to their approval or disapproval of military
policy.164  Furthermore, the Court identified no danger that the
recruiters’ views would be attributed to the schools.165  Similarly,
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Court ruled that a
state law requiring the accommodation of guest speakers in private
shopping centers did not transgress the First Amendment.166  The
shopping centers’ owners argued that the requirement that they
host speakers amounted to compelled speech.167  The Court
disagreed, finding that the owners were not being made to “affirm
. . . any governmentally prescribed position or view,” that they
could easily “dissociate” themselves from the speakers, and that
there was no danger of dampening public debate by penalizing
editorial discretion.168
Pure speech compulsions are especially offensive because they 
make a person “speak things they do not want to speak.”169  A law 
requiring students to pledge allegiance to the American flag is an 
archetypal instance of a pure speech compulsion.170  However, the 
principle has a broader reach.  For instance, in Wooley v. Maynard, 
the Court found unconstitutional a law forcing drivers to display 
161. See id.
162. Rumsfeld v. Forum For Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 47 (2006).
163. Id. at 61–62.
164. See id. at 64–65.
165. Id. at 66.
166. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 75, 76, 88 (1980).
167. Id. at 87–88.
168. Id. at 88.
169. Volokh, supra note 135, at 368.
170. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942).
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the New Hampshire state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their 
license plates, reasoning that it effectively drafted drivers to serve 
as “couriers” of an ideological message crafted by the state.171  
Based on the cases discussed above, a court might find that a 
law impermissibly compels speech if it:  
(1) imposes a prohibitive financial cost for accommodating
speech, thereby dissuading speakers from addressing
controversial matters;172
(2) unduly interferes with editorial discretion;173
(3) exclusively advantages the speech of an adversarial
party;174
(4) drafts a person into the role of “courier” for state ideology,175
or otherwise make them “affirm [a] governmentally prescribed
position or view[;]”176
(5) forces the inclusion of an expressive unit into an intelligible
aggregative speech act, thus changing its meaning;177 and/or
(6) involves the accommodation178 of another’s speech in a
manner or context that: (a) does not allow the host to plainly
“disavow any identity of viewpoint” with the accommodated
speaker, or (b) suggests that the host approves of the
accommodated speech.179
171. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).  Interestingly, Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the state motto would not be reasonably 
imputed to the driver, thus emphasizing the attenuation theme that arguably 
proved decisive in Rumsfeld and PruneYard.  See id. at 721–22 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
172. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
173. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 10–11
(1986); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. 
174. See Pac. Gas & Elect. Co., 475 U.S. at 12–13.
175. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–17.
176. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
177. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 568–69, 578 (1995). 
178. Many of the accommodation cases involve requirements to host
speakers on one’s premises (FAIR, PruneYard), but “accommodation” 
ultimately has a broader definition, as the Court placed the right-to-access 
laws of Pacific Gas and Tornillo in this category.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006). 
179. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87; Wooley, 430 U.S.
at 721–22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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C. ESICA and Compelled Speech
Based on the foregoing principles, and for the following
reasons, ESICA arguably would not impermissibly compel speech 
from major social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter. 
1. The nature of digital media substantially diminishes
traditional concerns about the prohibitive costs of accommodating
speech
In Tornillo, where a right-to-access law required newspapers 
to give column space to public figures criticized in their pages, the 
Court highlighted the prohibitive costs of accommodating speech in 
the context of print media.180  The Court worried that newspapers, 
faced with finite space and averse to additional editing and printing 
expenses, would opt to remain silent about controversial topics 
rather than bear the costs of accommodating speech.181  This 
rationale is closely tied to the nature of print media; therefore, it is 
largely inapplicable to digital media, which lacks the inherent 
limitations of the former mode of communication.  True, ESICA 
might require social media platforms to host accounts and content 
that would otherwise be suspended or removed.  However, the vast 
scale at which the platforms operate would likely render the burden 
of accommodation de minimis.  Indeed, ESICA could conceivably 
reduce costs by narrowing the scope of content susceptible to 
moderation. 
2. ESICA would not interfere with editorial discretion because
the major social media platforms do not exercise conventional
editorial discretion
Editorial discretion is the deliberate selection of material for 
publication according to the publisher’s tastes and aims.182  
Editorial discretion is fundamentally communicative.  It announces 
a considered value judgment: X is beautiful, Y is true, Z is 
180. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974); see also
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
181. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–57.
182. Here, the term “publisher” should be understood broadly enough to
embrace a newspaper and a cable news operator. 
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newsworthy.183  From this perspective, the major social media 
platforms exercise negligible editorial discretion.  Rather, they are 
best described as “passive receptacle[s] or conduit[s]”184 for torrents 
of variegated content published by independent users.185  The 
millions of content units that pour through Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube daily are inexpressibly diverse.  Moreover, users generate 
content proactively, normally posting without review or 
permission.186  Therefore, it is absurd to suggest that the major 
social media platforms exercise meaningful editorial discretion in 
the conventional meaning of that term.   
True, the social media platforms are not entirely laissez-faire 
in their approach to content.  They sometimes remove posts that 
are abusive, obscene, illegal, or otherwise contrary to broadly-
framed terms of service.187  Similarly, at least one major social 
media platform labels posts that contain misleading information 
and disputed or unverified claims.188  Finally, every platform 
183. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636–37 (1994) (“Through
‘original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations 
or programs to include in its repertoire,’ cable programmers and operators 
‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide 
variety of formats.’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’n, Inc., 476 U.S. 
488, 494 (1986) (emphasis added))).  
184. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
185. For instance, in May 2020, Twitter users generated an average of 500
million tweets per day.  David Sayce, The Number of Tweets per day in 2020, 
https://www.dsayce.com/social-media/tweets-day/#more-313 [perma.cc/7CJ3-
XZCA] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).  Almost none of these tweets were 
commissioned or screened by Twitter before their publication.  Nunes v. 
Twitter, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Twitter does not 
‘review’ the content of tweets.  It does not ‘edit’ the content of tweets.  It does 
not make decisions about whether to send out a tweet.”).  The other major 
social media platforms have comparably enormous figures.  See, e.g., Mansoor 
Iqbal, YouTube Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), BUS. OF APPS (Oct. 15, 
2020), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/youtube-statistics/ 
[https://perma.cc/LQZ6-M8TV] (500 hours of video uploaded on YouTube every 
minute).   
186. See, e.g., Nunes, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 967.
187. See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/X8YZ-P8ZK] (last visited Jan. 14, 
2021).  
188. Updating our approach to misleading information, TWITTER,
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-
misleading-information.html [perma.cc/2PZT-47L6] (last visited Jan. 14, 
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employs sophisticated and rather mysterious algorithms to 
prioritize content per user preferences.189   
Yet these interventions, such as they are, do not amount to 
editorial discretion in the traditional sense.  Imagine a newspaper 
that published millions of reader letters on a daily basis.  Now 
imagine that these minimally reviewed, independently generated 
letters comprised almost the entirety of the newspaper’s content. 
Would a reasonable person hold that this newspaper exercised 
editorial discretion—even if it occasionally retracted a letter for 
containing abusive language or advancing a flagrantly untrue 
claim?  
The major social media platforms’ business model may be 
characterized as “come one, come all.”  ESICA would simply 
incentivize the platforms to observe this relatively hands-off 
approach with respect to political content. 
3. ESICA would not exclusively advantage the speech of
adversarial parties
In Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court signaled its suspicion of 
laws that force speakers to solely foreground antagonistic 
opinions.190  However, ESICA would not require the major social 
media platforms to extend special solicitude to the speech of 
adversarial parties.191  The  platforms would not have to give voices 
with which they disagree a privileged position from which to speak, 
nor would they have to prominently and exclusively display 
contrary opinions.  
2021).  Exactly how Twitter applies these labels is unclear.  See id. (referencing 
“internal systems” and reliance on “trusted partners”).   
189. See, e.g., Joshua Boyd, The Facebook Algorithm Explained, 
BRANDWATCH (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/the-facebook-
algorithm-explained/; What are Promoted Tweets?, TWITTER, 
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/overview/what-are-promoted-trends.html 
[https://perma.cc/CE7N-NNB3] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
190. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 14
(1986); see also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). 
191. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 5–7, 13 (“Access is limited to
persons or groups . . . who disagree with appellant’s views . . . and who oppose 
appellant in Commission proceedings.  Such one-sidedness impermissibly 
burdens appellant’s own expression.”); see also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243–44. 
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4. ESICA would not make the major social media platforms
“couriers” of state ideology
The Court has evinced hostility toward laws that make 
individuals “couriers” of state ideology.192  Such laws are 
unconstitutional because they force speakers to “foster” state-
sanctioned messages, forging an undesired “associat[ion]” between 
the state’s ideology and its unwilling messengers.193  Thus, the 
Court in Barnette struck down a law requiring school children to 
recite the national pledge of allegiance194 and in Wooley struck 
down a law requiring drivers to display a philosophically-charged 
motto on their license plates.195  However, these cases are 
inapposite.  While ESICA might require platforms to maintain 
political content produced by state actors—content the platforms 
would otherwise remove for one reason or another—it would 
simultaneously protect, and thus indirectly foster, content critical 
of state propaganda.  Additionally, there is little danger that 
reasonable observers would impute the opinions of these actors to 
the platforms themselves.196  Finally, ESICA would help platforms 
resist state pressure to suppress adversarial content—pressure to 
which platforms have bowed in the past197—by providing a 
readymade legal justification for hewing to politically neutral 
content moderation.  Far from drafting the major social media 
platforms into the service of the state, or some party that 
192. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–17 (1977); see also W. Va.
State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625–26, 628–29 (1943). 
193. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, 717 n.15.
194. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
195. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
196. See id. at 720–22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“For First Amendment
principles to be implicated, the State must place the citizen in the position of 
either apparently or actually ‘asserting as true’ the message.”).  Although 
Justice Rehnquist found himself in the Wooley minority, his reasoning proved 
important in later cases, including PruneYard and FAIR, discussed infra 
Section III.C.6.  Moreover, as already noted, the Wooley majority concedes, 
albeit implicitly, the analytical significance of the imputation of the state’s 
message to the messenger.  See id., 430 U.S. at 715, 717 n.15 (majority opinion).  
197. See, e.g., Erik Wemple, Facebook admits error in censoring anti-Obama
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participates in the governance thereof, ESICA would ensure that 
the platforms mature into neutral fora for lively democratic 
discourse.  
5. ESICA would not alter the content of the major social media
platforms’ speech because there is no coherent speech product to
alter
The content that populates the major social media platforms is 
not integrated or arranged so as to sound an intelligible “common 
theme”198 that might be changed by the inclusion of discordant 
material.  The major social media platforms are therefore dissimilar 
to the parade in Hurley, which the Court viewed as a discrete and 
orderly event with a relatively discernible cultural message.199  Nor 
are the platforms comparable to the crisis pregnancy centers in 
NIFLA, whose medical advice was governed by an ideological 
opposition to abortion.200  Rather, the platforms act as “passive 
receptacles” for spontaneous and ever-mutating user-generated 
content.201   
Some may respond that the Court already views the major 
social media platforms as coherent speech products.202  However, 
the Court has acknowledged the fluidity of internet free speech law, 
which is tied to the technology’s “protean” quality.203  There is no 
reasonable basis for regarding these platforms as “coherent speech 
products” worthy of heightened First Amendment protection, given 
the nature of the medium.   
198. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995). 
199. Id. at 569–70.
200. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2368 (2018). 
201. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
202. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“[T]he
Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First 
Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that 
medium.”). 
203. Id. at 1732.
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6. Under ESICA, the major social media platforms would be able
to easily and plainly disassociate from users’ disagreeable speech
In PruneYard and FAIR, the Court identified a host’s capacity 
to publicly disavow an accommodated speaker’s opinion as a crucial 
factor in compelled speech analysis.204  Under ESICA, the major 
social media platforms would remain free to publish disclaimers 
distinguishing their stances from those of users with whom they 
disagree.  Seemingly, the bill would even allow platforms to engage 
with posts (e.g., by labelling them misleading, untruthful, or 
otherwise problematic)—so long as such engagement is neutrally 
applied to content across the political spectrum and not designed to 
negatively impact a particular party, candidate, or viewpoint. 
Simply put, ESICA would not force the major social media 
platforms to adopt content moderation policies giving rise to an 
impermissible “implication” of endorsement.205 Absent an 
“intimat[e] connect[ion]” between the platforms and the speech of 
any given user, there is no appreciable infringement on autonomy 
of expression, a fundamental interest guarded in the compelled 
speech context.206   
CONCLUSION 
Free speech—understood as isēgoria and parrhēsia—is the 
lifeblood of democracy.  This blood now flows through the veins of 
social media, which provides every citizen an equal opportunity for 
candid, confrontational speech.207  Therefore, the major social 
204. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Instit. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). 
205. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (1977).
206. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995). 
207. The debate over Section 230 continues to evolve at a rapid clip.  Several
developments, while outside the scope of this Comment, merit brief mention.  
In May 2020, the Trump administration acknowledged the danger of 
politically-biased censorship on social media and recommended that Section 
230 immunity extend only to those who moderate content in good faith.  See 
Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (May 28, 2020).  In June 2020, 
Senators Hawley and Rubio introduced a bill that would “prohibit Big Tech 
companies from receiving Section 230 immunity unless they update their 
terms of service to operate under a clear good faith standard and pay a $5,000 
fine if they violate those terms.”  Press Release, Senator Marco Rubio, Rubio, 
Hawley Announce Bill Empowering Americans to Hold Big Tech Companies 
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media platforms must be dissuaded from engaging in politically 
biased content moderation.  ESICA offers a creative and arguably 
constitutional means of protecting and nourishing America’s robust 
free speech tradition on the “vast democratic forums” of the 
internet.  Ultimately, ESICA should be seen not as compelling 
speech, but as securing speech, ensuring the advance of America’s  
noisy, noble democratic experiment into cyberspace.  
Accountable for Acting in Bad Faith (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/rubio-hawley-
announce-bill-empowering-americans-to-hold-big-tech-companies-
accountable-for-acting-in-bad-faith [perma.cc/D42E-AALA].  In August 2020, 
the Department of Justice recommended “reform[ing]” and “realign[ing]” 
Section 230 so as to safeguard free speech on the major social media platforms.  
See Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ag/department-
justice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act-
1996?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/AX8P-
UE38] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).  In December 2020, President Trump vetoed 
the National Defense Authorization Act because, among other things, it failed 
to eliminate Section 230 liability for social media companies.  See Sahil Kapur 
and Dareh Gregorian, Congress overrides Trump’s veto for the first time on 
major military bill, NBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2021), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/congress-overrides-trump-s-veto-
first-time-major-military-bill-n1252652 [https://perma.cc/N82K-DAQX].  On 
January 8, 2021, Twitter “permanently suspended” President Trump in the 
wake of the Capitol Riot.  Brian Fung, Twitter bans President Trump 
permanently, CNN BUSINESS (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/
08/tech/trump-twitter-ban/index.html [perma.cc/5ZKZ-KDND].  Such a 
suspension effectively eliminates all of his tweets from public viewing.  Twitter 
also seems to have undertaken a widespread purge of conservative accounts.  
See, e.g., James Woods (@RealJamesWoods), TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021, 10:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/RealJamesWoods/status/1347754402581340163 [https://
perma.cc/S9FR-8NZY] (a far-right celebrity claiming to have lost 85,000 
followers within roughly 36 hours).  Such actions bespeak the timeliness of this 
Comment and the salience of ESICA and similar legislation.  Yet they 
simultaneously call into question this Comment’s contention that the 
platforms do not exercise editorial discretion or produce coherent speech 
products.  The question is whether censoring criminal (or borderline criminal) 
content—or the users who produce such content—really amounts to editorial 
discretion as traditionally understood, and whether such actions render the 
platforms coherent speech products.  Events will likely continue to outpace this 
Comment, but hopefully its core arguments and principles will remain 
valuable in judging the wisdom and lawfulness of regulating the major social 
media platforms to ensure robust free speech online.  
